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august· Red Teaming · acme
F-0412HighAny signed-in member can read another org's invoices
Attack traceaugust attack
  1. Scope approved00:00
    staging.acme.devsbx_2c71e04
  2. Routes mapped00:04
    41 routes6 take an org id
  3. Actor swap00:11
    /orgs/:orgId/billing/invoices
    org_12 → org_77as member_ext
  4. Got through00:12
    200 OK2 invoices from org_77
  5. Patch written02:31
    route.ts +4membership check
  6. Retest02:38
    403 Blockedowner 200
Captured exchangeHTTP/1.1
Requestmember_ext · org_12
GET /api/orgs/org_77/billing/invoices HTTP/1.1
host: staging.acme.dev
authorization: Bearer ••••41ae
Response403 Blocked
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
content-type: application/json
{
"error": "forbidden",
"reason": "not_a_member"
}
Same request, same session. Now 403. Owner still 200.
Patch and retestaugust fix --apply --verify
orgs/[orgId]/billing/invoices/route.ts+4 -0
18export async function GET(req: Request, ctx: Ctx) {
19 const session = await requireSession(req);
20 const { orgId } = ctx.params;
21+ const member = await db.membership.findFirst({
22+ where: { orgId, userId: session.userId },
23+ });
24+ if (!member) return forbidden("not_a_member");
25 const invoices = await listInvoices(orgId);
26 return Response.json({ invoices });
27}
FixMembership is resolved before any invoice is read.
$august retestF-0412
Cross-tenantmember_ext → org_77403Blocked
Owner controladmin_77 → org_77200Allowed
[PASS · BLOCKED]cross-tenant 403 · owner 200
RL tracesha256:41be...7c02

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